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I. Introduction
Many people believe the current trade talks through the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”), the Doha Round, will end unsuccessfully.1 The current lack of an agreement among
the approximately 149 WTO members has renewed discussions for bilateral and regional trade
agreements.2 One potential free trade agreement that revived itself as a result of the collapse of
the Doha Round is the Free Trade Area of the Americas (“FTAA”).3 Differences in opinion
between the United States of America and Brazil had previously caused friction in already
difficult negotiations for the FTAA, similar to the issues between developing and developed
countries that complicated the Doha Round.4 This paper will argue that eliminating the current
1

See Economic Focus, Least Favoured Nation, ECONOMIST, Aug. 5-11th, 2006, at 68

(hereinafter Least Favoured Nation) (stating that the bigger members of the WTO could have
avoided the indefinite suspension of the Doha Round of trade talks on July 24th 2006, if they
asked more of themselves than of their rivals).
2

See, e.g., Kevin C. Kennedy, The FTAA Negotiations: A Melodrama in Five Acts, 1 LOY. U.

CHI. INT’L L. REV. 121, 130-31 (2004) (noting Brazil’s response to the United States to have
FTAA negotiations for investment, competition policy, and government procurement completed
within the Doha Round, if the United States wanted agricultural subsidies and antidumping rules
to be negotiated within the WTO resulting in a partial shelving of the FTAA).
3

See Thomas Andrew O’Keefe, Potential Conflict Areas in any Future Negotiations Between

MERCOSUR and the NAFTA to Create a Free Trade Area of the Americas, 14 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 305, 305 (1997) (stating that the leaders of the countries in the Western Hemisphere,
except Cuba, agreed to begin negotiations to create a FTAA).
4

See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 130-31 (observing that the issues that have divided the WTO

1

tariff on ethanol will be a good point to restart FTAA negotiations, will aid politicians’ goal of
obtaining energy independence for the Untied States, and it will simply the current tariff
structure for ethanol.5
II. Background
A. The Dream of a Free Trade Area for The Americas
In 1994 the Summit of the Americas was held in Miami, at which the leaders present
established the basis for a FTAA in their Plan of Action.6 This lead to ministerial meetings in
order to prepare for the negotiations, which were launched from the Santiago Summit in 1998

members at Cancun and during the Doha Development Round, agricultural subsidies and market
access for agricultural products, could also lead to the failure of FTAA negotiations).
5

See Conference, Trade as a Guarantor of Peace, Liberty and Security? The Role of Peace in

the Bretton Woods Institutions, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1133, 1138 (2005) (hereinafter
Conference) (informing that there are pressures in the United States and Europe to include
sustainable development and other non-trade issues in the WTO’s mandate); see also Feature,
World News, 6 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 70, 70 (2006) (reporting that ethanol produced
from sugar cane in Brazil is less costly than ethanol produced from corn in the United States, and
that Brazil currently has the largest sugar cane industry in the world).
6

See O’Keefe, supra note 3, at 305; see also Summit of the Americas, Trade, Investment, and

Financial Stability, http://www.summit-americas.org/Quebec-Trade/trade-eng.htm (last visited
Dec. 4, 2006) (hereinafter Summit of the Americas) (informing that the preparatory meetings to
begin FTAA negotiations lasted years).

2

where leaders committed themselves to actual progress by 2000.7 Negotiations continued and in
2004 the Special Summit was held where the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the Doha
Round in the Declaration of Nuevo León, possibly as a result of the difficulty finding an
agreement between countries in the FTAA negotiations.8 Then recently in 2005 leaders at the
Summit of the Americas issued their Declaration of Mar del Plata reiterating their desire to
achieve a balanced and comprehensive FTAA agreement.9 Since the Doha talks seems to have
ended in failure, at least for now, talks of the FTAA have resurfaced as countries are pursing
various regional and bilateral agreements.
B. The Hopes and Failure of the Doha Round of Trade Talks
In November 2001 at the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, WTO members launched
the Doha Round of trade talks from Qatar.10 The world’s trade ministers agreed to begin trade
7

See Summit of the Americas, supra note 6 (reiterating the mandates from the Miami Summit,

the Santiago Summit expanded the FTAA mandate to include tariffs, non-tarrif barriers,
investment, subsidies, agriculture, intellectual property rights, government procurement, trade
remedies, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, rules of origin, dispute resolution, and
competition policy, standards, and procedures).
8

See id. (reaffirming their commitment to the Doha Agenda in hopes of promoting better market

access, elimination of export subsidies, and reduction of trade distorting domestic support
especially for agricultural products).
9

See id.

10

See Marcos Jank & Mário Jales, On Product, Box and Blame-Shifting: Negotiating

Frameworks for Agriculture in the WTO Doha Round 58-59 (Washington, DC and Paris: InterAmerican Development Bank & Centre d’Etudes Prospectives Internationales 2004) available at

3

talks under the Doha Round and promised that they would complete the negotiations in three
years.11 Doha’s emphasis was to help the poorest countries by liberalizing trade in agricultural
goods and services.12 However, progress on these issues were slow and insufficient. Although
Doha reached an agreement on cutting some domestic support and eliminating some export
subsidies for agriculture goods from rich counties, emerging economies refused to compromise
on industrial tariffs until they saw more progress in agricultural trade.13 Adding pressure to find
a comprise is the fact that George Bush’s trade promotion authority expires in 2007 leaving
many to agree that the unofficial deadline for any Doha agreement is the end of 2006.14
Unfortunately, emerging and developed economies believed the concessions provided to each
other were insufficient to continue with the negotiations, thus missing an opportunity for a
successful Doha agreement.
http://www.iconebrasil.org.br/Documentos/i_INTAL_IYT_22_2005_Jank_Jales.pdf.
11

See Delivering on Doha’s Promise, ECONOMIST, Jan. 6, 2005, in Leaders Section (considering

the timeline ambitious, and the subsequent delay unsurprising since all global trade rounds have
yet to successfully complete by the time originally scheduled).
12

See id.

13

See id. (detailing the deadlock as a creation between developed and emerging economies, since

developed countries hesitated to further liberalize agricultural trade until they saw more progress
on industrial goods and services, and the opposite is true for emerging countries).
14

See id.; see also BRIGID STARKEY, MARK A. BOYER, & JONATHAN WILKENFELD, NEGOTIATING

A COMPLEX WORLD

49-51 (Rowman & LittleField 2005) (discussing how time pressures can

influence negotiations resulting in “a maxim to the effect that 90 percent of a negotiation takes
place in the last 10 percent of time allowed”).

4

C. America’s Desire to End its Dependence on Foreign Energy, Especially
Petroleum Products
The United States imported more than three and a half billion barrels of crude oil in 2004
to help satisfy Americans’ ever growing thirst for gasoline used for ground transportation.15
America’s increasing dependence on foreign oil creates possible problems for the country
including economic insecurity, continued large current account deficits, and financing tyrannical
leaders and terrorists with American oil money.16 Since the shock of the Arab oil embargo and
the subsequent history of oil, these threats have become increasing clear to Congress, resulting in
the importance of energy diversification to increase.17 Thus, Congress now has an opportunity to
properly address a low priority issue, the environment, under the guise of a high priority issue,

15

See C. Boyden Gray & Andrew R. Varcoe, Octane, Clean Air, and Renewable Fuels: A

Modest Step Toward Energy Independence, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 9, 55 (2005) (stating that in
2004 the United States used approximately 130 billion gallons of gasoline just for ground
transportation); see also Energy Information Administration,
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_imp_dc_NUS-Z00_mbbl_a.htm (last visited Nov.
26, 2006).
16

See Gray & Varcoe, supra note 15, at 10 (believing that the United States heavy reliance on

petroleum for transportation results in an increasing threat to American economic and security
interests, partly as a result of increasing petrol prices, increasing uncertainty over long term oil
supplies, and oil resources controlled by dictatorial leaders).
17

See 42 U.S.C. § 8801 (codifying congressional findings that the United States must reduce its

dependence on imported petroleum and natural gas by all economically and environmentally
possible means, specifically including the use of biomass energy as an alternative fuel).

5

economic and national security.18
The United States is presently the world second largest producer of ethanol behind
Brazil.19 Currently the domestic ethanol industry is in a period of rapid growth, however it
currently lacks the capacity to produce enough ethanol to create a gasohol blend of ten percent
ethanol to replace gasoline across the United States.20
D. Current Tax Structure for Ethanol Imported Into the United States
Currently the United States imposes a 2.5 percent ad valorem tax along with a 14.27
cents per liter tax on imported ethanol from countries with normal trade relations under the
harmonized tariff schedule.21 However, the United States exempts many countries from this
18

See STARKEY, BOYER, & WILKENFELD supra note 14, at 86-88 (defining high-politics issues as

ones traditionally recognized as threatening the survival of the state, while considering lowpolitics issues as ones not threatening to the survival of the state, such as the environment,
foreign aid, and health).
19

See RENEWABLE FUEL ASSOCIATION, RENEWABLE ENERGY SERVICES: AN EXAMINATION OF

U.S. AND FOREIGN MARKETS, UNDER SECTION 332(G) OF THE TARIFF ACT OF 1990 7 (2005)
(submitted testimony of Larry Schafer),
http://www.ethanolrfa.org/objects/documents/66/itctestimony041905.pdf (hereinafter RFA)
(listing 2004 world ethanol production where Brazil and the United State accounted for over
seventy percent of global production, with Brazil producing 400 million gallons more than the
United States).
20

See id. at 1-2 (stating that the ethanol industry is the fastest growing industry in rural America

and reducing the 2005 trade deficit by 5.1 billion dollars).
21

See HTSUS § XXII Ch. 99 (2006 Supp. 1, 2d Rev.) (imposing a 14.27 cents per liter tariff on

6

tariff or reduces the tariff under various free trade agreements or initiatives.22 In addition to the
U.S. ethanol tariff the U.S. partially exempts ethanol from a federal excise tax on motor fuel.23
The government based the exemption on the quality and amount of ethanol blended in a gallon of
fuel, coincidently the exemptions equal 14.27 cents per liter, which is the same amount as the ad
valorem tariff imposed on non-beverage ethanol.24 People in favor of the tariff argue that the tax
protects a young domestic industry, promotes the growth of the industry, and prevents the United
States from subsidizing foreign ethanol production.25
imported ethanol to be used as a fuel or in a mixture to be used in a fuel); HTSUS § IV Ch. 22
(2006 Supp. 1, 2d Rev.) (imposing a 2.5 percent ad valorem duty on ethanol imported for nonbeverage purposes).
22

See UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, PUBL’N NO. 3701, THE ECONOMIC

EFFECTS OF SIGNIFICANT U.S. IMPORT RESTRAINTS 48 (2004) (listing Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA), and Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) countries
along with Israel, Jordan, Chile, and Singapore as the countries that receive reduced or exempt
tariffs on ethanol imports to the United States).
23

See id. at 47 (explaining that the United States imposes an 18.4 cents per gallon federal excise

tax on motor fuels).
24

See id. (informing that the 2002 federal excise tax exemption for ethanol was 54 cents per

gallon of ethanol, which is the approximately 14.27 cents per liter).
25

See National Corn Growers Association v. Baker, 840 F.2d 1547, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1988)

(acknowledging domestic ethanol producers’ argument that exemption from a sixty cents per
gallon duty results in a sort of subsidy for importers of non-pure ethanol).

7

One staunch supporter of the ethanol tariff is Senator Chuck Grassley of Iowa.26 Along
with other senators, Senator Grassley has opposed lifting the ethanol tariff stating the domestic
supplies are sufficient to meet demands and that the only other major producer, Brazil, lacks
sufficient supplies to export ethanol at significant levels.27
III. Analysis
The issues that resulted in Doha’s failure also caused FTAA negotiations to temporarily
stall since both Brazil and the United States wanted certain FTAA issues negotiated at the WTO
level.28 One way to possibly ease the negotiations over these difficult issues is to begin with
other simpler issues to negotiate, thus creating goodwill and momentum in the negotiations.29
26

See Letter from Chuck Grassley, U.S. Senator, to George W. Bush, U.S. President (May 12,

2006) (on file with author), available at
http://grassley.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.View&PressRelease_id=5060
(hereinafter Letter from Senator Grassley to President Bush) (requesting President Bush to
reconsider his call on Congress to temporarily lift or suspend the duty on imported ethanol).
27

See 152 CONG. REC. S4106 (daily ed. May 5, 2006) (statement of Senator Grassley). But see

RFA, supra note 19 (acknowledging that Brazil produces more ethanol than any other country).
28

See Kennedy, supra note 2, at 131 (mentioning that some countries in the FTAA negotiations

wanted to resolve certain issues like agricultural subsidies and government procurement under
the Doha negotiations).
29

See STARKEY, BOYER, & WILKENFELD, supra note 14, at 131 (recommending that negotiators

focus on interests, such as creating a market for renewable fuels like ethanol, rather than on
positions, like continued subsidies, in order to build trust among negotiation adversaries and
increase confidence in the negotiations).

8

The United States could initiate this process with a discussion of reducing or eliminating its
ethanol tariff and adjusting some domestic legislation, thus allowing ethanol to satisfy America’s
energy thirst.30 In addition, a successful ethanol agreement may create many positive effects
later in the negotiations and for the Americas.31 First, it would reduce America’s dependence on
oil and potentially improve the United States security interests.32 An agreement on ethanol
would bring issues traditionally left out of free trade agreements into the negotiations and
ultimately into the agreement for a FTAA.33 The agreement may even satisfy the sugar industry
30

See, e.g., Gray & Varcoe, supra note 15, at 16-18 (describing how originally car

manufacturers had interests in using alcohol as a fuel, on its own or blended with gasoline, but
history prevented them from doing so because of a large excise tax on alcohol during the Civil
War made it cost prohibitive, then Prohibition made alcohol scarce, and lastly cheap oil made
ethanol uncompetitive).
31

See STARKEY, BOYER, & WILKENFELD, supra note 14, at 130 (noting that the strategy of

accentuating common grounds while downplaying areas of disagreements builds better
relationships among the parties).
32

See Brian R. Farrell, Fill ‘Er Up With Corn: The Future of Ethanol Legislation in America, 23

J. CORP. L. 373, 377 (1998) (quoting congressional findings that the United States is dependent
for a growing share of its energy needs on the Middle East); Gray & Varcoe, supra note 15 at 10
(believing that U.S. oil dollars may finance terrorism).
33

See Farrell, supra note 32 at 377 (stating that Congress found that ethanol blended with

gasoline produces a cleaner fuel when burned and that it can be produced from renewable
resources like grain); Conference, supra note 5 at 1138 (explaining that political pressure in the
developed countries is building to include all issues of an international economic nature, like

9

to allow greater market access for Latin America, resulting in less poverty.34
A. Reduction of the Ethanol Tariff May Restart FTAA Negotiations Since it
Addresses Some of the Concerns that Derailed Doha and Result in a Successful
Agreement for the Entire Hemisphere
Originally free trade agreements began among neighboring countries and had a
narrower scope than they do today.35 Although, today countries are entering global agreements
in the traditional areas such as security and economic interests, along with agreements that
include environmental concerns, climate control, and an assortment of other issues.36 The United
States can repair some of its negative image on climate control and the environment caused by its
refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol, by promoting the use of ethanol throughout the Americas.37
sustainable development and the environment into trade agreements).
34

See Gray & Varcoe, supra note 15, at 12 (arguing that an increase in ethanol for fuel use could

open the path to absorbing agricultural surpluses in developed countries, which have hindered
regional and global trade talks and hampered third world development).
35

See, e.g., James R. Holbein & Gary Carpentier, Trade Agreements and Dispute Settlement

Mechanisms in the Western Hemisphere, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 531, 532-33 (1993)
(discussing some of the steps to an Americas hemispheric trade agreement, with one of the
earlier major steps being the negotiations of NAFTA, which had aspects based on the CanadaUnited States FTA, hopefully leading to create a free trade zone from Anchorage to Tierra del
Fuego).
36

E.g., STARKEY, BOYER, & WILKENFELD, supra note 14, at 9-20 (discussing global climate

change negotiations, particularly in the Kyoto context that resulted in the Kyoto Protocol, ratified
by over sixty five countries as an example of an issue with growing importance).
37

See id. at 15, 20 (stating that many environmentalist were watching the Kyoto negotiations to
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Furthermore, a substantial percentage of Americans support steps to curb emissions of
greenhouse gases, which would allow the United States to include climate concerns in the FTAA
because it would create increase demand for agricultural products, like sugar and corn, which
may possibly reduce opposition from agricultural economies for environmental standards.38
Additional effects of increased agricultural production may reduce poverty in other countries that
join the agreement, thus increasing the power of labor groups, which would seek increased safety
standards.39
The belief that demand creates supply may also reduce the domestic sugar industry

see if the United States would redeem its environmental credentials, however after the
negotiations the United States failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol).
38

See Charles J. Hanley, U.S. Pushed Toward Emissions Control, NEWOBSERVER.COM, Nov. 19,

2006, http://www.newsobserver.com/102/story/512225.html (acknowledging that in the United
States political pressure is growing, regardless of party, to address greenhouse gas emissions,
especially since California passed state level reductions on greenhouse gases).
39

See Jessica Holzer, Ethanol Gusher!, FORBES, Oct. 9, 2006,

http://www.forbes.com/personalfinance/investingideas/2006/10/06/energy-ethanol-investing-bizenergy_cx_jh_1009ethanol_energy06.html (hereinafter Ethanol Gusher!) (acknowledging that
the United States lacks the resources to quickly convert food to ethanol without affecting its
food supply and that production of cellulosic ethanol, which does not affect food supply, needs
further development before it can replace gasoline with E10, a blend of ten percent ethanol and
the ninety percent gasoline that can run in all modern cars).
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hostility to the importation of foreign sugar.40 While ethanol can be produced from various
crops, the high cellulose context of sugar makes it an ideal source for ethanol production, which
is one reason why Brazil’s ethanol industry uses sugar over other crops.41 Other nations may
have a labor advantage when producing sugar but by increasing demand United States sugar
producers will have less to fear from foreign competition, furthermore by promoting
environmental standards in the FTAA, future negotiations will be more likely to contain stricter
environmental requirements, thus leveling the playing field between agricultural producers from
developed nations and those from developing nations.42 Lastly, the entire American agricultural
40

See James R. Holbein, Symposium Speech, An Analysis of Agricultural Trade Disputes Under

NAFTA, 28 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 639, 639 (2002) (asserting that farmers are always an important
political constituency, since agriculture goes to the core of every country’s national security and
its ability to support whenever necessary).
41

See Christopher Joyce, Study Backs Ethanol as Gasoline Substitute, NPR, Jan. 26, 2006,

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5173420 (explaining that corn is not the
future of ethanol because it lacks any significant energy advantage over fossil fuels, however
saying that the future of ethanol will rely on plants with high cellulose content, such as switchgrass or sugar cane); see also Feature, World News, 6 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 70, 70
(2006) (informing that Brazil derives its ethanol from sugar cane, and that they have the largest
sugar industry in the world).
42

See generally CAFTA POLICY BRIEF, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,

CAFTA FACTS: ENVIRONMENTAL FIRSTS IN CAFTA 1 (Fed. 2005),
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/Briefing_Book/asset_upload_fil
e601_7194.pdf (asserting that CAFTA goes beyond NAFTA in the environmental chapter, for
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industry can reduce its costs and increase its profits by embracing a competitive ethanol market
because it would reduce their soaring fuel costs, due to the increased price of oil, and increase
their profits as a result of growing demand for cleaner fuels.43
B. An Agreement on Ethanol will Ensure that the United States gets on track to
Obtaining Safer Energy Sources and Possibly Closer to Energy Independence
The United States imports massive amounts of oil to meet its energy needs, and a
substantial portion from the Middle East.44 Furthermore the high demand for oil raises the prices
and increases oil profits for countries the that are hostile to the United States, like Iran.45 While
the growth of an ethanol market may create trade diversion away from the Middle East as the
United States relies less on oil and more on renewable fuels, the continued purchase and trade in
the Middle East does not guarantee increased security for the United States.46 Therefore, it

example, CAFTA lowers the threshold to move a case forward to development of a factual
record).
43

See Ethanol Gusher!, supra note 39 (noting that high oil prices along with political and

consumer interests are attempting to wean America off its petroleum habit, consequently creating
a rush in ethanol investment).
44

See Energy Information Administration,

http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_epc0_im0_mbbl_m.htm (last visited
Nov. 26, 2006) (listing U.S. imports of crude oil by country or origin).
45

See, e.g., Symposium, Renewable Energy Sources for Development, 32 ENVTL. L. 331, 338

(commenting that Brazil’s expansive use of ethanol resulted in the country halving its oil
imports).
46

See Conference, supra note 5, at 1141-42 (questioning the belief that trade creates peace by
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appears that America’s interests are better served by purchasing energy from its neighbors and
helping the development of their economies instead of funding hostile governments or terrorist
farther abroad.
C. Creating a Comprehensive Agreement on Ethanol will Reduce the Web of
Exceptions Currently Applied, Consequently Simplifying the Customs Structure
and Reducing Bureaucracy
One other reason the United States should embrace an more open ethanol market is
potential for simplifying the current customs structure in regards to ethanol. The United States
currently applies different rates depending on the country of origin for the ethanol or the amount
imported.47 By creating a FTAA where ethanol is trade freely the United States can simply its
ethanol structure based on NAFTA, CAFTA, CBI, GSP, ATP, and the various FTA with other
counties in the Americas to one single agreement hopefully simplifying all these agreements into
one.
IV. Conclusion and Recommendations
In conclusion, the United States should offer to re-jump start negotiations for the FTAA
with the opening of the ethanol market. While this goal will liberalize trade in agricultural
products it will also increase America’s security by decreasing its dependence on foreign oil,
providing instances were increase trade led to conflict including the two World Wars, which
were preceded by unprecedented world market integration, the two Palestinian intifadas, which
were preceded by integration of the Palestinian and Israeli economies, and the American Civil
War, which was partially caused by a common market and common external tariff since the
South wanted cheap industrial imports and the North wanted to protect its industrial economy).
47

See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text (providing a quick overview of the current

ethanol tariffs and countries or groups of countries that qualify for exceptions).
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particularly Middle Eastern oil.48 Even though encouraging an ethanol market many not
necessarily achieve Congress’s optimistic goal of energy independence, it does shift American
energy dollars away from a region that is increasingly hostile to the United States, to a region
that is increasingly integrating with the United States.49 Furthermore, a simplification of the
tariff structure for ethanol or many other goods under a hemispheric trade zone may reduce
government bureaucracy since goods throughout the hemisphere will be treated equally in
theory.
Lastly, in response to the argument that eliminating the ethanol tariff and keeping the tax
break for ethanol will result in the United States subsidizing foreign ethanol, Congress can
change the point at which the tax break applies.50 Instead of applying the tax credit after the
ethanol is mixed into the fuel, it can be applied at the point the ethanol is produced.51 However,
48

See Gray & Varcoe, supra note 15, at 10 (outlining some of the major dangers of oil

dependence, which includes American oil expenditures financing terrorism and tyranny);
Holbein, supra note 40 at 639 (informing that disputes involving agricultural products may
include alcoholic beverages, fisheries products, and lumber, thus showing that agricultural
products are not limited to preprocessed grown or raised goods and could include ethanol);
49

See 42 U.S.C. § 8801 (expressing the hope of reducing America’s dependence on foreign non-

renewable fuels).
50

See Letter from Senator Grassley to President Bush, supra note 26 (decrying the idea of

suspending the ethanol tariff because it would act as a further subsidy to Brazil’s ethanol and
sugarcane industry).
51

See id. (acknowledging that American gasoline refiners receive a tax credit for every gallon of

ethanol they blend with gasoline, regardless of the ethanol’s origin, thus incorporating a potential
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under this scenario Congress would need to ensure that the tax credit is being offered only for
domestically consumed ethanol and not as an export subsidy or the United States may face
countervailing duties.52 Another option, less likely to face countervailing duties, is to create a
price floor for domestically produced and domestically consumed ethanol. This would ensure
that when the price of ethanol drops below a certain point, due to imports or any other factor, that
the ethanol producer would still receive a minimum payment that would encourage the growth
and development of the ethanol treatment. This approach may avoid being classified as an
export subsidy, and should be in line with national treatment because the ethanol producer
receives the market value for the ethanol, just as imported ethanol would, and then the
government compensates the producer for the difference in the market value and the price floor,
if the market value is below the floor.

solution to avoid the United States subsidizing foreign ethanol or sugarcane by specifying a
requirement of domestic ethanol for the tax credit or apply it to a different point in the
production process).
52

James Holbein, The Administration of Chapter 19 Binational Proceedings Under NAFTA, 5

U.S.-MEX. L.J. 57, 58 (1997) (defining the difference between antidumping and countervailing
duties, where antidumping duties are imposed on goods that are sold at less than fair value, while
countervailing duties are a trade remedy used in response to unfair government subsidies).
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